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LET ALL VOTERS VOTE: INDEPENDENTS AND THE 
EXPANSION OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Jeremy Gruber,* Michael A. Hardy,** & Harry Kresky*** 
The right to vote—who can vote and how—has been central to 
the American experiment.  In the midst of the Civil War when the 
existence of the United States was at stake and, with it the continuation 
of slavery, Abraham Lincoln began his historic Gettysburg Address 
with the words, “Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought 
forth, on this continent, a new nation, conceived in liberty, and 
dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”1  He ended 
with, “that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom, 
and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall 
not perish from the earth.”2  “Government by the people” raised and 
still raises the question of who are the people and to whom is the right 
to vote extended. 
For Americans, the issue of sovereignty and the legitimacy of 
government rests on the consent of the people and that consent is 
expressed through the ballot box.  Indeed, the right to vote is deeply 
valued by the public: An overwhelming 91% say that they consider the 
 
* Jeremy Gruber, J.D., is the Senior Vice President of Open Primaries. 
** Michael Hardy is the Executive Vice President and General Counsel to the National Action 
Network. 
*** Harry Kresky practices law in New York City and is counsel to IndependentVoting.org. 
The authors would like to acknowledge: Patricia E. Salkin, Esq., Provost, 
Graduate and Professional Divisions at Touro College and University 
System and thank her for her support; the leaders and organizers at 
IndependentVoting.org and Open Primaries for their efforts in taking the 
issue of the rights of unaffiliated voters to the American people; and a very 
special thank you to the editors of the Touro Law Review. 
1 Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, The Gettysburg Address 
(Nov. 19, 1863), http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/gettysburg/good_cause/transcript.htm 
(transcript of Cornell University’s copy). 
2 Id. 
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right to vote as essential to their own personal sense of freedom.3  
Though nowhere mentioned in our Constitution, the two major 
political parties occupy the dominant position in our electoral system.  
Both parties have been guilty of gerrymandering districts to benefit 
their electoral prospects.  And when it comes to the voting rights of 
unaffiliated voters, now the largest group of voters in the country, there 
is also bipartisan unity over blocking their participation in primary 
elections unless allowing them access to the primary will benefit the 
parties. 
Our judiciary, independent of the political branches of 
government, and the final arbiters of this nation’s Constitution, is, we 
submit, insufficiently sensitive to the rights of these unaffiliated voters 
and to the impact of their disenfranchisement.  This Article seeks to 
demonstrate that the closed partisan primary system, under which only 
members of the two major parties can participate in the selection of the 
candidates who will appear on the general election ballot, is at odds 
with fundamental principles of equality and freedom of association, 
“[t]he identification and protection of fundamental rights is an 
enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.”4  The 
recognition of the rights of unaffiliated voters is a new frontier in the 
civil rights/voting rights struggle. 
Consider the following.  Over the past quarter-century, the 
demographic profile of the United States has changed substantially.5  
The country has become more racially and ethnically diverse, and 
better educated.6  Citizens are significantly less likely to affiliate with 
a political party.7  In fact, a larger percentage of American voters now 
identify as independents (42%) than as Democrats (29%) or 
Republicans (26%).8  That is especially true for Millennials, who now 
 
3 Public Supports Aim of Making It ‘Easy’ for All Citizens to Vote: Only One-in-Five Back 
Mandatory Voting, PEW RES. CTR. (June 28, 2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/06/28/ 
public-supports-aim-of-making-it-easy-for-all-citizens-to-vote/. 
4 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 




7 Renata Sago et al., Sick of Political Parties, Unaffiliated Voters Are Changing Politics, 
NPR (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/02/28/467961962/sick-of-political-parties-
unaffiliated-voters-are-changing-politics. 
8 Jeffrey M. Jones, Democratic, Republican Identification Near Historical Lows, GALLUP 
(Jan. 11, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/188096/democratic-republican-identification-
near-historical-lows.aspx. 
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comprise as large a voting block as baby boomers, half of whom 
identify as independents.9  That is a big shift from as recently as 2004, 
when the electorate was nearly evenly divided into thirds by the three 
groups.10  The number of voters exercising their right not to affiliate 
with a political party is growing steadily, both as an absolute number 
and as a percentage of all registered voters.11  These numbers suggest 
that the growth will continue and possibly even accelerate in the years 
to come. 
In 2016, 26.3 million unaffiliated voters were barred from 
participating in the presidential primary, and millions more registered 
Democrats and Republicans were prevented from voting for the 
candidate of their choice because of a patchwork of restrictive 
registration rules.12  From New York to Arizona, voters—whose tax 
dollars fund the primary process—were denied the right to fully 
participate.13  In an electoral system that provides voters with limited 
choices and sets up additional barriers to voter participation, it is not 
hard to understand why Americans are one of the least active voting 
populations among developed countries.14  The structure of our 
political process discourages challenges to the dominant parties and 
their prevailing ideological viewpoints. 
Despite these shifts in the electorate, the U.S. Congress and 
state legislatures consist almost entirely of Democrats and Republicans 
and there are only two independent governors.15  Of 535 members of 
Congress, only two U.S. Senators are independents.16  Bernie Sanders 
and Angus King affiliate as independents.17  On the state level, 7,330 
 
9 Millennials in Adulthood: Detached from Institutions, Networked with Friends, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/03/07/millennials-in-adulthood/. 
10 Party Identification Trends, 1992-2014, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://www.people-press.org/2015/04/07/party-identification-trends-1992-2014/#total. 
11 Party Affiliation, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
12 DNC Chair Tom Perez & RNC Chair Ronna Romney McDaniel: Open the Primaries, 
NOW!, OPEN PRIMARIES, http://www.openprimaries.org/unrig-it-2020 (last visited Mar. 17, 
2019). 
13 Id. 
14 Drew Desilver, U.S. Trails Most Developed Countries in Voter Turnout, PEW RES. CTR. 
(May 21, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/15/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-
most-developed-countries/. 
15 Current Third Party and Independent State Officeholders, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Current_third_party_state_officeholders (last visited May 8, 2019). 
16 116th United States Congress, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/116th_United_State 
s_Congress (last visited May 8, 2019). 
17 List of Current Members of the U.S. Congress, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/List 
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legislators are affiliated with either the Republican or Democratic 
parties; and only 53 are independents or affiliated with a minor party.18   
The lack of competitive races in the United States is an 
additional sad hallmark of the existing electoral regime.  Across the 
country, an increasing number of congressional and state elections are 
largely pro forma because of partisan gerrymandering and a patchwork 
of restrictive ballot access laws.  Indeed, election competitiveness 
across the country is at a forty year low, with only five percent of 
Americans living in districts with elections won by five percent or 
less.19  Similarly, more and more Americans live in areas with 
uncontested elections than ever before: 36.7%.20  In these 
noncompetitive or “safe” races, candidates only compete for votes, if 
at all, in primary elections, which more often than not decide the 
winner of the general election.  Current law nevertheless permits the 
exclusion of a sizeable minority of the district’s electorate from 
participating at this pivotal point.  This dilemma is exacerbated in 
electoral districts where the Republican and Democratic parties have 
worked together to push unaffiliated voters out of the primary election 
process.  Such a state-run system disenfranchises millions of voters, 
gives the two dominant political parties unfair access and control over 
our democracy, and forces legislators to be accountable only to their 
partisan base and not the general electorate.  It is at odds with the 
reality of the present-day electorate; and the consequences of this 
imbalance are real and immediate. 
The general electorate does not benefit from limiting voter 
participation and states do not have an interest in perpetuating this 
growing imbalance.  Meaningful political participation requires the 
opportunity to influence electoral outcomes and cannot be predicated 
on one’s membership in one of the two major political parties.  Voters, 
in our view, have a fundamental right to not associate with a political 
party.  This right is violated when a state conditions the right to full 
participation in the electoral process on joining a private political 
party.  Equal protection, whether rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
_of_current_members_of_the_U.S._Congress (last visited May 8, 2019). 
18 Partisan Composition of State Legislatures, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Partisa 
n_composition_of_state_legislatures (last visited May 8, 2019). 
19 Carl Klarner, Competitiveness in State Legislative Elections: 1972-2014, BALLOTPEDIA 
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or the roughly parallel requirements of the Fifth Amendment, provides 
the principal constitutional paradigm for analyzing the curtailment of 
this fundamental right to an equally meaningful vote.  This is because 
equal protection is violated “when the electoral system is arranged in 
a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ 
influence on the political process as a whole.”21  To an extent, these 
issues have also been analyzed under the First Amendment. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the direct 
primary and an outline of the jurisprudence regarding primary 
elections.  Part II then examines the history of suffrage in the United 
States and discusses the jurisprudence regarding voting, including the 
fundamental nature of the franchise.  Part III discusses the Supreme 
Court’s test for evaluating voting regulations.  Part IV examines the 
conflicting jurisprudence for determining when a voter may, or may 
not, be excluded from a primary election.  Part V analyzes the evolving 
electorate and political landscape in the United States.  Part VI then 
argues that closed primaries are unconstitutional.22  In Part VII, this 
Article concludes that a review of historic junctures (i.e., allowing 
former slaves to vote, the direct primary, woman’s suffrage, 
reapportionment and the dismantling of Jim Crow) suggests that the 
full integration of unaffiliated voters into the process and the rejection 
of party membership as a qualifier to vote in an integral part of the 
electoral process are the next step in the further development of our 
democracy. 
I. PRIMARY ELECTIONS 
A. The Historical Underpinnings of the Direct 
Primary 
Since their founding, political parties have become “the 
preeminent political organizations of mass, popular democracy.”23  
Although some of the founders of this country, George Washington 
among them, thought that political parties could lead only to pernicious 
factionalism, parties quickly came into being soon after the founding 
of the republic.24  During the nineteenth century, political parties 
 
21 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986). 
22 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 474 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
23 PAUL ALLEN BECK, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 26 (8th ed. 1997).  
24 Id. at 20-22. 
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usually nominated their candidates by convention or caucus, with 
varying levels of participation by party activists.25  By the end of the 
century, however, there was widespread belief that these processes 
were corrupt.26  
The direct primary was one of several measures instituted by 
the Progressive movement in the early twentieth century to destroy 
what they viewed as “the corrupt alliance” between wealthy special 
interests and the political machine.27  Robert La Follette, a Progressive 
movement leader in Wisconsin, made the following argument in 
support of the direct primary:  
Under our form of government the entire structure rests 
upon the nomination of candidates for office. This is the 
foundation of the representative system. If bad men 
control the nominations we cannot have good 
government. Let us start right. The life principle of 
representative government is that those chosen to 
govern shall faithfully represent the governed. . . . With 
the nominations of all candidates absolutely in control 
of the people, under a system that gives every member 
of a party equal voice in making that nomination, the 
public official who desires re-nomination will not dare 
seek it, if he has served the machine and the lobby and 
betrayed the public trust.28 
La Follette and his fellow reformers would be shocked at how 
successful the major parties have become over the years in 
manipulating primary elections to maintain ideological conformity and 
top-down control.  No wonder so many Americans believe “the system 
is rigged.”29 
Today, all states either require or make available primary 
elections for nomination of candidates for elections to the U.S. 
Congress and for most state legislative and executive positions.  These 
 
25 MALCOLM E. JEWELL, PARTIES AND PRIMARIES: NOMINATING STATE GOVERNORS 6 
(1984). 
26 Id. 
27 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 257 (1955). 
28 JEWELL, supra note 26, at 7. 
29 See Hannah Fingerhut, Trump Supporters Far Less Confident Than Clinton Backers That 
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systems vary considerably in their degree of “openness,” measured by 
the ability of every voter to cast a ballot in the primary election for his 
or her candidate of choice for each elected office.  However, about a 
third of the states still use caucuses for one or both parties’ nomination 
of presidential candidates.   
B. Legal Background 
The Supreme Court has addressed challenges to a blanket 
primary;30 a “top-two” primary;31 a closed primary;32 a semi-closed 
primary;33 and prohibitions on “fusion” candidates.34  The Supreme 
Court has yet to address directly the constitutionality of an open 
primary.35  As a result, challenges are being resolved inconsistently 
across the United States.36  There has been litigation in Alaska,37 
Idaho,38 South Carolina,39 Hawaii,40 Montana,41 New Jersey,42 New 
Mexico,43 Oregon44 and Utah,45 as well as an increasing number of 
voter initiative efforts concerning the way our primary process is 
conducted.46   
 
30 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
31 Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008). 
32 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. 
Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976), aff’d, 429 U.S. 989 (1976). 
33 Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005). 
34 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997). 
35 See Robin Miller, Annotation, Constitutionality of Voter Participation Provisions for 
Primary Elections, 120 A.L.R. Fed. 5th 125 (2014). 
36 Id. 
37 Alaskan Indep. Party v. Alaska, 545 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2008). 
38 Idaho Republican Party v. Ysursa, 765 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Idaho 2011). 
39 Greenville Cty. Republican Party Exec. Comm. v. South Carolina, 824 F. Supp. 2d 655 
(D.S.C. 2011). 
40 Democratic Party of Haw. v. Nago, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1176 (D. Haw. 2013), aff’d, 
833 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2016), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 2114 (2017). 
41 Ravalli Cty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. McCulloch, 154 F. Supp. 3d 1063 (D. Mont. 
2015), aff’d sub nom. Ravalli Cty. Republican v. McCulloch, No. 16-35375 (9th Cir. May 4, 
2016), and appeal dismissed, 655 F. App’x 592 (9th Cir. 2016). 
42 Balsam v. Sec’y of N.J., 607 F. App’x 177, 179 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. 
Balsam v. Guadagno, 136 S. Ct. 189 (2015). 
43 Chavez v. Oliver, No. S-1-SC-37371 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 2018). 
44 Conant v. Brown, 248 F. Supp. 3d 1014 (D. Or. 2017). 
45 Utah Republican Party v. Herbert, 144 F. Supp. 3d 1263 (D. Utah 2015). 
46 See, e.g., James Nord, South Dakota Voters May See Open Primaries Amendment in 
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1. Freedom of Association47 
The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of association 
has been interpreted by courts to include two distinct and sometimes 
conflicting interests.48  First, the right of an individual to associate with 
the political party of her choice as a voter and as a candidate for 
office;49 and second, the right of a political party to limit participation 
in their processes to those voters who choose to affiliate with it.50  
These interests have been accorded different levels of protection by the 
Supreme Court.51  Indeed, the jurisprudence of association is one of 
the least developed concepts in constitutional law.52  There is 
conflicting precedent over a party’s right to limit participation in its 
primaries that will be reviewed below.  The inconsistent treatment of 
party primaries stands in contrast to cases treating equality in voting 
power as paramount. 
i. Party Autonomy and the “Right Not 
to Associate” 
In Cousins v. Wigoda,53 the Supreme Court applied the right of 
free association to political parties.  Cousins confronted the issue 
whether the states or the national party should govern the seating of 
delegates at the Democratic Party’s national nominating convention.54  
Based on the political associational rights of the National Democratic 
Party and its members, the Court held that the party and not the state 
should determine the rules governing the seating of convention 
 
47 This article will engage the less recognized, but important, right of a voter not to associate 
with a political party. 
48 See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973). 
49 See Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) 
(“[T]he freedom to associate . . . necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people 
who constitute the association.”); Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 
(1989) (“[A] political party has a right . . . to select a ‘standard bearer who best represents the 
party’s ideologies and preferences.’” (citation omitted)). 
50 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire ex rel. Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“Any 
interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of 
its adherents.”). 
51 John R. Labbé, Louisiana’s Blanket Primary After California Democratic Party v. Jones, 
96 NW. U. L. REV 721, 727 (2002). 
52 Frances R. Hill, Constitutive Voting and Participatory Association: Contested 
Constitutional Claims in Primary Elections, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 535, 536 (2010). 
53 419 U.S. 477 (1975). 
54 Id. 
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delegates.55  Accordingly, the Court concluded that the dispute 
concerning the seating of delegates was an intraparty struggle that 
should be resolved at the party’s convention.56  The Court further stated 
that the state’s interest in protecting the effectiveness of votes cast in 
the primary elections and its interest in protecting the overall integrity 
of the electoral process did not constitute a compelling state interest in 
the context of selecting national party convention delegates.57 
The Supreme Court held that the decision in Cousins controlled 
in Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La 
Follette.58  In La Follette, the Court was faced with a conflict between 
the state-mandated open primary, which required delegates to a party’s 
convention to vote in accordance with the primary’s outcome, and the 
party rule that, contrary to state law, required a closed primary 
election.59  In holding that states may not force a party to honor the 
results of an open primary by requiring delegates to vote in accord with 
those primary results,60 the Court made clear that it was not deciding 
the constitutional validity of open primaries; rather its decision 
addressed only whether a state, once it has chosen an open primary 
format in which non-party members may vote, may force a national 
political party to honor the results of that primary, when those results 
were reached in violation of national party rules.61  Relying on its 
decision in Cousins, the Court found this violation of party rules to be 
impermissible under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.62  In 
language that the Court has invoked repeatedly,63 La Follette asserted 
that free association to advance political beliefs “necessarily 
presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the 
association, and to limit the association to those people only.”64 
Whether the heightened associational protection for the 
convention would apply to a primary election remained for the Court 
 
55 Id. at 487-91. 
56 Id. at 491. 
57 Id. at 489-91. 
58 450 U.S. 107 (1981). 
59 See id. at 112. 
60 Id. at 126. 
61 Id. at 120. 
62 Id. at 121-24. 
63 See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000); Tashjian v. 
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986). 
64 La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122. 
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to decide in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.65  In 
Tashjian, the Republican Party of Connecticut adopted a rule 
permitting independent voters to vote in Republican primaries for 
federal and state offices,66 “[m]otivated in part by the demographic 
importance of independent voters in Connecticut politics.”67  Relying 
on La Follette, the Court found a Connecticut closed primary that 
required voters in any primary to be registered as party members, 
contrary to the Republican Party of Connecticut’s rule inviting 
independents to vote in its primaries, unconstitutional.68  The Court 
reasoned that the closed primary “impermissibly burdens the right of 
[the party’s] members to determine for themselves with whom they 
will associate, and whose support they will seek, in their quest for 
political success.”69  “The Party’s attempt to broaden the base of public 
participation in and support for its activities is conduct undeniably 
central to the exercise of the right of association.”70  The Court 
concluded that no substantial state interest supported Connecticut’s 
decision to limit the primary election to registered party members.71 
Although Tashjian addressed a closed primary, it demonstrated 
that the constitutional analysis in a primary election law challenge—
whether a state’s primary system “severely burdens” a party’s 
associational rights—depends fundamentally on the party’s own views 
as to who it wants to associate with because it is “the right of [a party’s] 
members to determine for themselves with whom they will 
associate.”72  Thus, after Tashjian, it was clear that the state could not 
force a party to restrict participation in its primary to party members.  
The question whether a state could force a party to expand participation 
in its primary, however, remained unanswered by our country’s 
highest court. 
The Supreme Court’s next confrontation with state laws 
regulating party primaries came in Eu v. San Francisco County 
Democratic Central Committee.73  Unlike other cases that challenged 
state qualifications for voter participation in primary elections, Eu 
 
65 479 U.S. 208 (1986). 
66 Id. at 210. 
67 Id. at 212. 
68 Id. at 214. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 225. 
72 Id. at 214. 
73 489 U.S. 214 (1989). 
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involved laws that barred political parties from endorsing candidates 
in primary elections and regulated parties’ internal organizational 
structure.  The Court struck down a California statute prohibiting 
political parties from endorsing candidates in party primaries,74 noting 
that it “hampers the ability of a party to spread its message and 
hamstrings voters seeking to inform themselves about the candidates 
and the campaign issues.”75  Citing the parties’ right of free 
association, the Court held that the freedom to associate gives the party 
the right to “select a standard-bearer who best represents the party’s 
ideologies and preferences.”76  The Court’s holding in Eu was 
consistent with La Follette in that it upheld the right of a party to 
regulate its internal affairs, like a party convention.  With regard to the 
endorsement of candidates, Eu simply accorded the party organization 
the right to make its views publicly known. 
2. State Regulation of Primary Elections 
The associational rights of political parties are not absolute.77  
States are not required to run its primary elections exactly as the parties 
dictate.  Courts have already rejected such arguments.78  When they 
engage in the nominating process, established political parties are 
subject to a wide range of state regulation,79  and do not have unfettered 
control over who can vote in primary elections.80  To determine 
whether a state election law is constitutional, a court must first 
determine the magnitude of injury to a party’s First Amendment rights, 
and then balance that injury against the state’s interests in the 
regulation.81  If the burden on First Amendment rights is severe, the 
state regulation must be “narrowly tailored and advance a compelling 
state interest.”82  Where a law imposes less than severe burdens on 
 
74 Id. at 216-17. 
75 Id. at 223. 
76 Id. at 224. 
77 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). 
78 Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 919 (1993) 
(upholding direct primary over party’s objection); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) 
(striking down party’s exclusion of blacks from primary). 
79 See Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186 (1996); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 
436 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1978). 
80 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
81 See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986). 
82 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997). 
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associational rights, however, the state need only have “important 
regulatory interests” to justify the law.83   
i. The Tension Between Associational 
Rights and State Regulation of 
Primary Elections 
The Constitution guarantees “to every State in the Union a 
Republican Form of Government.”84  The Constitution, however, does 
not define what it means to have a “[R]epublican form of 
government.”85  In fact, the original text of the Constitution is virtually 
silent about the rules governing elections at the state and local level.86  
It has been noted that one historic reason there is no mention of 
political parties is there were no parties in existence when the 
Constitution was conceived and ratified.87  Indeed, the Constitution 
was designed and intended to govern without political parties.88   
The Supreme Court has long recognized that states have a 
compelling interest in regulating elections to ensure that the 
democratic process is open and fair.89  The Constitution grants states 
“broad power to prescribe the ‘Time, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives,’90 which power is matched 
by state control over the election for state offices.”91  “Common sense, 
as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government 
must play an active role in structuring elections; ‘as a practical matter, 
there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair 
and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany 
the democratic process.’”92  Six amendments,93 and several decisions 
 
83 Id. 
84 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
85 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
86 Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 
(2000) (No. 99-401), 2000 WL 245529. 
87 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE 
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES 1780-1840, at 40 (1969). 
88 Id. 
89 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). 
90 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
91 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986). 
92 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 443 (1992) (citation omitted). 
93 The Fifteenth Amendment guarantees the right to vote to racial minorities.  The 
Seventeenth Amendment requires popular election of Senators.  The Nineteenth Amendment 
guarantees the right to vote to women.  The Twenty-Third Amendment permits residents of 
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of the Supreme Court, have helped define the modern contours of the 
right to vote, the right to run for office, and the right to fair 
representation.94  Within this framework, states remain free to 
experiment and decide how best to protect their citizens’ rights.95   
With significant exceptions, state election regulation of 
elections has been held to be constitutionally permissible.96  The test 
adopted by the Supreme Court to evaluate state election regulations is 
a flexible one: although election regulations that impose severe 
burdens on political party associational rights must be narrowly 
tailored and advance a compelling state interest, lesser burdens require 
less exacting review, and a state’s important regulatory interests will 
usually suffice to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.97  
Cases involving challenges by a political party to interference with its 
associational rights indicate that the Supreme Court is willing to extend 
greater protection to a political party’s right of association than to an 
individual’s.98 
I. Permissible Burdens on an 
Individual’s Right of 
Association 
In Kusper v. Pontikes,99 the Supreme Court considered an 
Illinois law prohibiting a person from voting in the primary election of 
a political party if the person had voted in the primary election of 
another political party within the past twenty-three months.100  Relying 
on the constitutional right of free association, the Court held that “the 
right to associate with the political party of one’s choice is an integral 
part of this basic constitutional freedom.”101  First, the Court found that 
Illinois’s rule placed a substantial restriction on a person’s ability to 
 
the District of Columbia to vote for President.  The Twenty-Fourth Amendment bars the poll 
tax in federal elections.  The Twenty-Sixth Amendment grants the vote to persons over the 
age of 18. 
94 See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS (4th ed. 2012). 
95 Id. 
96 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438.   
97 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997). 
98 Shannon L. Spangler, Freedom of Association—Explanation of the Underlying 
Concepts—Republican Party of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 841, 849 (1986). 
99 414 U.S. 51 (1973). 
100 Id. at 52. 
101 Id. at 57. 
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change party affiliation, and therefore to associate with the party of her 
choice.102  More importantly for the Court, however, the Illinois rule 
substantially interfered with free association because although a voter 
may be able to immediately change party affiliation, she is effectively 
disenfranchised for a twenty-three month period thereafter and unable 
to effectively participate in her party of choice.103 
In addition to protecting a voter’s right to associate with her 
party of choice, the Supreme Court has recognized the right of a 
candidate to associate with a particular political party, but it has 
permitted substantial regulation of this right.104  In Storer v. Brown,105 
the Court examined a California election code that required a person 
to wait twelve months after leaving one political party before running 
for office as an independent or member of another party.106  In 
upholding the state’s requirement, the Court noted that it required little 
foresight for a candidate to switch parties in time to run as a member 
of a different party.107  The Court also suggested that it did not need to 
protect the right of a candidate to associate with a party as strongly as 
the right of a voter to associate with a party.108  Furthermore, the Court 
found that with the state’s restriction fulfilled a number of compelling 
state interests including keeping losers off an already crowded ballot, 
reducing party factionalism, and maintaining the stability of the state 
election process.109 
Similarly, in Rosario v. Rockefeller,110 the Court upheld a limit 
on an individual’s right to change party affiliation.111  To enroll as a 
party member in New York, a voter at that time was required to submit 
her enrollment at least thirty days before the general election 
immediately preceding the first primary election in which the voter 
wanted to participate.112  Therefore, a voter was required to change her 
registration between eight and eleven months before the primary in 
 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 58. 
104 Labbé, supra note 51, at 728. 
105 415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
106 Id. at 734. 
107 Id. 
108 See id. 
109 Id. at 735-36. 
110 410 U.S. 752 (1973). 
111 Id. at 762. 
112 Id. at 752. 
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which she wanted to participate.113  The Court rejected the argument 
that this system violated a voter’s right of free association.114  The 
Court noted that under New York’s system a voter was free to change 
party affiliation on an annual basis,115 and the state had an interest in 
enforcing a waiting period to prevent party raiding.116 
II. Permissible Burdens on a 
Political Party’s Right of 
Association 
In Williams v. Rhodes,117 the Supreme Court confronted a state 
electoral framework that effectively prevented any party other than the 
Democratic and Republican parties from qualifying for a position on 
the ballot.118  The Court held that “only a compelling state interest in 
the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to 
regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.”119  The Ohio 
election law required a new party to obtain a petition signed by a 
number of voters equal to at least fifteen percent the number of ballots 
cast in the last preceding gubernatorial election.120  Rejecting the 
state’s asserted interest in promoting a two-party system in order to 
promote stability in the election process, the Court found that 
“[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our 
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.”121  The Court 
also could not identify any state interest where there was no evidence 
that permitting third party access to the ballot would result in “a choice 
so confusing that the popular will could be frustrated.”122 
The Supreme Court narrowed the scope of political parties’ 
freedom of association in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.123  
 
113 Id. at 760. 
114 Id. at 758. 
115 Id. at 759. 
116 Id. at 760-61.  Party raiding is the process whereby voters not affiliated with a particular 
party vote in that party’s primary in an attempt to nominate a weak candidate from the 
opposing party.  See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 (E.D. Cal. 1997).  
By doing so, the raiders attempt to secure an easy victory in the general election.  See id. 
117 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
118 Id. at 24-26. 
119 Id. at 31. 
120 Id. at 24-25. 
121 Id. at 32. 
122 Id. at 33. 
123 520 U.S. 351 (1997). 
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In Timmons, a state law prohibited candidates from appearing on the 
ballot for more than one political party—a process known as fusion.124  
The New Party brought suit when its candidate for office, also the 
candidate of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, was denied access 
to the ballot.125  The New Party claimed that its First Amendment right 
to freedom of association was violated.126  “Regulations imposing 
severe burdens on plaintiffs’ [associational] rights,” the Court said, 
“must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest.”127  
However, “[l]esser burdens . . . trigger less exacting review, and a 
State’s ‘important regulatory interests’ will usually be enough to 
justify ‘reasonable nondiscriminatory restrictions.’”128  Using this 
standard, the Court held that the burdens in question were less than 
severe and thus justified by the State’s “correspondingly weighty” 
valid state interests in ballot integrity and political stability.129 
II. THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
A. Background 
The history of the right to vote in the United States has been 
one marked by intense conflict over who has the right and how it can 
be secured.  During the early days of the Republic, franchise rights 
were vested only in white, male property owners over the age of 21.130  
By the end of the 1850s most states had abolished property 
requirements.131  Over time, voting privileges were extended through 
struggle, and ultimately through legislation, to larger segments of the 
population.132  In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment enfranchised African 
American men, but grandfather clauses, literacy tests, and poll taxes 
still barred most freed men from the voting booth.133  Fifty years later, 
 
124 Id. at 353. 
125 Id. at 354. 
126 Id. at 355. 
127 Id. at 358. 
128 Id. (citation omitted). 
129 See id. 369-70. 
130 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY 
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the Nineteenth Amendment extended the right to vote to women.134  By 
the mid-1950s most states had extended suffrage to Native 
Americans.135  In 1964, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment abolished the 
poll tax, and the following year the Voting Rights Act outlawed 
literacy tests and other measures of the Jim Crow South that had long 
been used to suppress the African American vote.136  Relying on the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court has also 
been active in expanding the franchise, even in the absence of 
congressional enactment.137 
B. Legal Background 
In a voting rights case, a court’s preliminary task is to choose 
the appropriate standard with which to measure the extent of an 
individual’s right to vote.  Though the Supreme Court has determined 
that the right to vote is a fundamental right, the Court has also 
concluded that states may regulate and restrict access to the polls in 
order to administer fair and legitimate elections. 
1. The Post-Civil War Voting Rights Cases: 
Congressional Regulation of Elections 
Immediately after the Civil War, the Supreme Court had the 
occasion to explain why and how voting mattered in response to 
violence, electoral fraud and corruption to circumvent the post-Civil 
War amendments granting citizenship, voting rights, and equal 
protection to former slaves.138  These cases raised the question of the 
nature and scope of the federal government’s authority to protect the 
right to vote consistent with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution.139 
In Ex parte Siebold,140 the Court considered the constitutional 
authority of a federal statute providing for federal election monitors, 






138 Hill, supra note 52, at 543.  
139 Id. 
140 100 U.S. 371 (1879). 
141 Id. at 379-82. 
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Writing for the Court, Justice Bradley reasoned that “[i]n the light of 
recent history, and of the violence, fraud, corruption, and irregularity 
which have frequently prevailed at such elections . . . the exertion of 
the power, if it exists, may be necessary to the stability of our frame of 
government.”142  The Court’s majority opinion, while primarily 
confined to an analysis of the balance between federal and state power, 
described for the first time the extensive power of Congress to assure 
that state governments did not interfere with a citizen’s federal right to 
vote.143  Because Congress has such authority, the Court held that 
Congress necessarily has the authority to enforce its regulations.144  
The majority held:  
We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle, that the 
government of the United States may, by means of 
physical force, exercised through its official agents, 
execute on every foot of American soil the powers and 
functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the 
power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the 
power to keep the peace to that extent.145 
In Ex parte Yarbrough,146 the Court considered the 
constitutional authority for federal legislation concerning the franchise 
in general, and the right to vote in congressional elections 
specifically.147  Here, the petitioners were not state officials but private 
persons.148  The Court held that the right to vote for a member of 
Congress is “fundamentally based upon the [C]onstitution which 
created the office of member of [C]ongress, and declared it should be 
elective, and pointed to the means of ascertaining who should be 
electors.”149  In upholding the congressional power, the Court noted 
“[t]he exercise of the right [to vote] . . . is guarantied [sic] by the 
[C]onstitution, and should be kept free and pure by Congressional 
enactments whenever that is necessary.”150   
 
142 Id. at 382. 
143 Id. at 385-87. 
144 Id. at 387.  
145 Id. at 395. 
146 110 U.S. 651 (1884). 
147 Id. at 652, 654. 
148 Id. at 662.  
149 Id. at 664. 
150 Id. at 665. 
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The Court took the position that its newly articulated state-
action doctrine did not apply to issues arising in the context of voting 
and the conduct of elections, reasoning that: 
The reference to cases in this court in which the power 
of congress under the first section of the fourteenth 
amendment has been held to relate alone to acts done 
under state authority can afford petitioners no aid in the 
present case. For, while it may be true that acts which 
are mere invasions of private rights, which acts have no 
sanction in the statutes of a state, or which are not 
committed by any one exercising its authority, are not 
within the scope of that amendment, it is quite a 
different matter when congress undertakes to protect 
the citizen in the exercise of rights conferred by the 
constitution of the United States, essential to the 
healthy organization of the government itself.151 
In Siebold and Yarborough, the Court upheld the preeminent 
authority of the U.S. government to enforce its own laws ensuring 
citizens’ right to vote in congressional elections, which was protected 
by the Fifteenth Amendment.  This line of cases continued with United 
States v. Mosley.152  Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes stated that 
“[w]e regard it as equally unquestionable that the right to have one’s 
vote counted is as open to protection by Congress as the right to put a 
ballot in a box.”153 
2. The Voting as a “Fundamental Right” Cases 
At the Constitution’s founding, “[v]oting was in no sense a 
federal constitutional right.”154  The Supreme Court first alluded to the 
right to vote as fundamental as far back as 1886 in Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins.155  In discussing the concept of sovereignty, the Court noted 
that the right to vote, although not “strictly” a “natural right,” “is [still] 
regarded as a fundamental political right, . . . preservative of all 
 
151 Id. at 665-66. 
152 238 U.S. 383 (1915). 
153 Id. at 386. 
154 Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1512 (2002). 
155 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
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rights.”156  The Court reiterated this theme in 1932 in Smiley v. Holm,157 
noting that the Constitution provides authority for the state to “enact 
the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which 
experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental 
right involved.”158  The Supreme Court, however, did not affirmatively 
address the constitutional protection of the right to vote until the 1940s.  
In United States v. Classic,159 the issue presented itself in the 
context of criminal allegations of voter fraud in a federal election.160  
The Court framed the constitutional issue as “whether the right of 
qualified voters to vote in the Louisiana primary and to have their 
ballots counted is a right ‘secured . . . by the Constitution.’”161  The 
Court held that federal primary elections fall within the reach of the 
constitutional provision and are thus subject to congressional 
regulation.162  Observing the text of Article I, Section 2, which 
provides that congressional representatives are to be chosen by the 
people of the states by electors, the Court reasoned that “[t]he right of 
the people to choose, whatever its appropriate constitutional 
limitations, . . . is a right established and guaranteed by the 
Constitution and hence is one secured by it to those citizens and 
inhabitants of the state entitled to exercise the right.”163 
The constitutional protection of the right to vote in federal 
elections was upheld in Reynolds v. Sims,164 in which the Court held 
that, under the Equal Protection Clause, both houses of a bicameral 
legislature have to be apportioned on the basis of population.165  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the Alabama legislature failed to reapportion 
state voting districts despite uneven population growth.166  As a result, 
they argued, voters were denied equal suffrage in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.167  In its equal protection analysis, the Court focused 
on whether the record displayed any discrimination that impermissibly 
 
156 Id. 
157 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). 
158 Id. at 366; see also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 524 (2001). 
159 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
160 Id. at 307. 
161 Id. (alteration in original). 
162 Id. at 320. 
163 Id. at 314. 
164 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
165 Id. at 568. 
166 Id. at 540. 
167 Id. 
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interfered with the plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected right to vote.168  
The Court stated: 
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental 
matter in a free and democratic society. Especially 
since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the 
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
meticulously scrutinized.169 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Classic and Reynolds 
established that the right to vote in federal elections is protected by the 
Constitution.170  Later, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of 
Elections,171 the questions regarding the constitutional protection of 
voting in state elections, the nature of the right to vote, and the 
appropriate standards of scrutiny were answered.  In Harper, the 
Supreme Court struck down a poll tax of $1.50 in Virginia state 
elections.  Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found that “a State 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an 
electoral standard.”172  Recognizing that the Court was overturning a 
practice that had never been before thought to be inconsistent with the 
Equal Protection Clause, Justice Douglas maintained that “the Equal 
Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular 
era.”173  In support of this proposition, he invoked the Court’s decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.174  He further noted: 
“Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for the purposes of the 
Equal Protection Clause do change.”175 
By 1970, the Court had recognized voting as a fundamental 
right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.176  For example, in 
 
168 Id. at 561. 
169 Id. at 561-62. 
170 Kelly E. Brilleaux, The Right, the Test, and the Vote: Evaluating the Reasoning 
Employed in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 70 LA. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2010). 
171 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
172 Id. at 666. 
173 Id. at 669. 
174 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
175 Harper, 383 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added). 
176 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-28 (1969). 
21
Gruber et al.: Voting Rights Act
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019
670 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,177 the Court invalidated 
a statute which allowed only owners or lessees of taxable realty and 
parents or guardians of children in public schools a right to vote in 
school board elections.178  The Court held that “[s]tatutes granting the 
right to vote to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of 
denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs 
which substantially affect their lives.”179  Similarly, Carrington v. 
Rash,180 invalidated a Texas law that barred military personnel from 
participating in local elections.  The State defended the exclusion, in 
part, on the ground that it was necessary to protect the distinct interests 
of the civilian community, interests the State asserted military voters 
would not share.181  The Court rejected this interest, holding that 
“‘[f]encing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because 
of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”182  The 
right to vote “cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear 
of the political views of a particular group of bona fide residents.”183  
Likewise, in Dunn v. Blumstein,184 the Court struck down durational 
residency requirements imposed by the states as a precondition to 
voting.  In this type of case, the Court recognized that when states deny 
some citizens the right to vote, those citizens are essentially deprived 
of a fundamental political right safeguarding all rights.185 
3. The White Primary Cases 
Between 1927 and 1953, the Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional four attempts to block African American voters from 
participating in primary elections in Texas.186  Central to this line of 
cases (the so-called White Primary cases) was “the idea that the right 
to vote in a political party primary is constitutionally protected, and the 
 
177 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
178 Id. at 632-33. 
179 Id. at 626-27. 
180 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
181 Id. at 93. 
182 Id. at 94. 
183 Id. 
184 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
185 Id. at 336. 
186 Ellen D. Katz, Resurrecting the White Primary, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 332 (2004). 
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state cannot statutorily delegate to a political party or its membership 
the effective right to discriminate on the basis of race.”187 
In the first of the White Primary cases, Nixon v. Herndon,188 
the Court held that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment 
extend to primary elections, as well as general elections.189  Thus, a 
statute that barred African Americans from voting in a party primary 
was a “direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth 
[Amendment].”190  Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, reasoned that 
it was unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment, “because it 
seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement of 
the Fourteenth.”191 
In Nixon v. Condon,192 the second of the White Primary cases, 
the Court found that when a state delegates the authority to restrict 
eligibility to vote in a primary election to a group that is part of a 
private association, and the group then acts under that state authority 
but independently of the association’s membership, the group is acting 
as an agent of the state rather than as a private association.193  Thus a 
resolution by the Texas Democratic Party Executive Committee that 
adopted a discriminatory provision concerning the party’s membership 
and voting requirements violated the Fourteenth Amendment.194   
Nine years later in Smith v. Allwright,195 the third of the White 
Primary cases, the Court found state action in a primary election 
conducted by a private “voluntary association” when the election 
process included duties imposed upon the party by state law.196  The 
fact that a state convention created the discriminatory nature of the 
election process at issue was held to be irrelevant.197  Relying heavily 
on United States v. Classic,198 in which the Court held that Congress 
 
187 Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 307 (1993). 
188 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
189 Id. at 540. 
190 Id. at 540-41. 
191 Id. 
192 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 
193 Id. at 88-89. 
194 Id. at 89. 
195 321 U.S. 649 (1944) 
196 Id. at 654. 
197 Id. at 663. 
198 313 U.S. 299 (1941).  This decision expressly overturned Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 
45 (1935), which had held that discriminatory policy created by a state convention of the 
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could regulate primary and general elections “where the primary is by 
law made an integral part of the election machinery,”199 the Court held 
that Classic effectively overruled Grovey v. Townsend (which held that 
primary elections were not state action under the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments) because “the recognition of the place of the 
primary in the electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a 
party of the power to fix qualification of primary elections is delegation 
of a state function that may make the party’s action the action of the 
state.”200  The Court put the right to vote in the center of its decision to 
overrule Grovey.201  Because the general public election was so 
dependent upon the private primary, the Court held that there was no 
reason to distinguish the state functions respecting the general election 
from the private functions respecting the primary.202 
But in 1953, only a year before the Court decided Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, the Court went further in the last of the 
so-called White Primary cases, Terry v. Adams,203 and found state 
action where a state permits a wholly private but race-exclusionary 
political organization to meet before a party primary. 204  In Terry, the 
Court struck down the Jaybird primary after finding that it was always 
determinative of the general election.  Despite finding that “the state 
does not control that part of this elective process which it leaves for 
the [party] to manage,”205 the Court, relying on the net effect of 
denying blacks the right to vote,206 held that the process was violative 
of the Fifteenth Amendment.207  In its reasoning, the Court noted that 
for fifty years preceding the case the Jaybird primary had been 
controlling for both the Democratic primary and the general 
election,208 and that the admitted purpose of the Jaybird Party was to 
deny blacks the opportunity to vote.209   
 
Democratic Party did not constitute state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments. 
199 Classic, 313 U.S. at 318. 
200 Allwright, 321 U.S. at 660. 
201 Id. at 664. 
202 Id. at 660. 
203 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
204 Id. at 469. 
205 Id. at 469. 
206 Id. at 469-70. 
207 Id. at 469. 
208 Id.  The Jaybird Party was an all-white Democratic ‘club’ that functioned as a subgroup 
of the state Democratic Party. 
209 Id. at 464-65. 
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4. The Malapportionment Cases 
In Baker v. Carr,210 the Supreme Court announced that claims 
having to do with redistricting and the apportionment of legislative 
seats by geographic area were justiciable under the Equal Protection 
Clause.211  In holding that the Court had jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, the Court cited the White Primary cases,212 finding that “[a]n 
unbroken line of our precedents sustains the federal courts’ jurisdiction 
of the subject matter of federal constitutional claims of this nature.”213  
Although Baker decided that a voter’s challenge to an apportionment 
scheme is justiciable, it did not resolve the claim’s merits.  The 
Supreme Court first addressed that question one year later in Gray v. 
Sanders.214  In Gray, the Court held unconstitutional a “county unit” 
system for counting votes, under which votes in rural counties were 
weighted more heavily than those cast in urban counties.215  Justice 
Douglas, writing for the Court, declared, “[t]he conception of political 
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth 
Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”216 
The following year the Supreme Court decided Wesberry v. 
Sanders.217  In Wesberry, the Court built on its previous ruling in Gray 
v. Sanders to hold that all federal congressional districts within each 
state had to be made up of a roughly equal number of voters.  
Demonstrating the importance of the right to vote, the Court noted: 
No right is more precious in a free country than that of 
having a voice in the election of those who make the 
laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other 
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to 
vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room 
 
210 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
211 Id. at 237. 
212 Id. at 200 & n.19 (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 
286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927)). 
213 Id. at 201. 
214 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
215 Id. at 379-80. 
216 Id. at 381. 
217 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily 
abridges this right.218 
Within four months of Wesberry, the Supreme Court decided 
Reynolds v. Sims.219  In Reynolds, the Court was confronted with a 
challenge to the malapportionment of the Alabama state legislature.220  
In deciding the case, the Court considered the constitutional 
implications of systems that impact participation in politics.221  First, 
the Court noted that “[i]t would appear extraordinary to suggest that a 
State could be constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that 
certain of the State’s voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their 
legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote 
only once.”222  The Court went on to note that systems that have the 
effect of giving one citizen more votes than another also run afoul of 
the Constitution.223  The problem was that “overvaluation of the votes 
of those living here has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation 
of the votes of those living there.”224  Vote dilution, in turn, offends the 
Constitution because: 
[E]ach and every citizen has an inalienable right to full 
and effective participation in the political processes of 
his State’s legislative bodies. . . . Full and effective 
participation by all citizens in state government 
requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally 
effective voice in the election of members of his state 
legislature.225 
Because of Alabama’s failure to redistrict in light of changes 
to its population, the Court held that Alabama’s district apportionment 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.226  The Reynolds decision 
marked the expansion of the class of people protected by the 
 
218 Id. at 17-18. 
219 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 562-68. 
222 Id. at 562. 
223 Id. at 562-63. 
224 Id. at 563. 
225 Id. at 565. 
226 Id. at 577. 
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause in apportionment to 
all citizens—not just racial minorities.227   
5. The Ballot Access Cases 
In Williams v. Rhodes,228 the Supreme Court struck down a 
series of Ohio ballot access laws that made it virtually impossible for 
any candidate of a party except the Republican or Democratic parties 
to qualify for the ballot.229  In its opinion, the Court noted that a state 
must demonstrate a compelling government interest to justify a law 
that places an unequal burden on minority voting groups.230  Similarly, 
in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,231 the 
Court invalidated a state law that imposed a different signature 
requirement for access to the ballot for new political parties in 
statewide elections as opposed to elections in political subdivisions.232  
In so holding, the Court noted that laws that restrict access to the ballot 
also “implicate the right to vote” because these laws “limit[] the 
choices available to voters,” and that the law under consideration was 
not the “least restrictive means” of achieving the state’s goal of 
ensuring that candidates on a ballot are actually serious candidates who 
have a modicum of support.233  Thus, when the “vital individual 
right[]” to vote is at stake, “a State must establish that its classification 
is necessary to serve a compelling interest.”234 
Likewise, in Bullock v. Carter,235 the Supreme Court struck 
down on equal protection grounds a series of filing fees that the state 
of Texas required primary candidates to pay to their political parties.236  
Invalidating the system on equal protection grounds, the Court found 
that, with the high filing fees, “potential office seekers lacking both 
personal wealth and affluent backers are in every practical sense 
 
227 Carroll Rhodes, Changing the Constitutional Guarantee of Voting Rights from Color-
Conscious to Color-Blind: Judicial Activism by the Rehnquist Court, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 309, 
339 (1996). 
228 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
229 Id. at 31. 
230 Id.. 
231 440 U.S. 173 (1979). 
232 Id. at 187.  
233 Id. at 175-77, 187. 
234 Id. at 184, 186. 
235 405 U.S. 134 (1972). 
236 Id. at 137-38. 
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precluded from seeking the nomination of their chosen party, no matter 
how qualified they might be, and no matter how enthusiastic their 
popular support.”237  The “exclusionary character” of the system also 
violated the constitutional rights of non-affluent voters.238  “We would 
ignore reality,” the Court stated, “were we not to recognize that this 
system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, 
according to their economic status.”239  The Court concluded: 
By requiring candidates to shoulder the costs of 
conducting primary elections through filing fees and by 
providing no reasonable alternative means of access to 
the ballot, the State of Texas has erected a system that 
utilizes a criterion of ability to pay as a condition to 
being on the ballot, thus excluding some candidates 
otherwise qualified and denying an undetermined 
number of voters the opportunity to vote for candidates 
of their choice.240 
III. VALIDITY OF VOTING RESTRICTIONS 
In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,241 the Supreme 
Court applied a “stricter standard” than rational basis to invalidate a 
poll tax under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.242  In Harper, the Court relied on the invidiously 
discriminatory nature of the poll tax to justify the application of 
heightened scrutiny.243  The Court first noted that the right to vote was 
a “fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights,”244 
and “where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the 
Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain 
them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”245  Thus, 
under Harper, while the State had the right to impose “reasonable 
residence restrictions” on the ability to vote, “even rational restrictions 
 
237 Id. at 143. 
238 Id. at 144. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 149. 
241 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
242 Id. at 670; see also Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189 (2008). 
243 See Harper, 383 U.S. at 666. 
244 Id. at 667. 
245 Id. at 670. 
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on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter 
qualifications.”246  Although it stopped short of adopting a strict 
scrutiny requirement in all cases, the Court gave the impression that 
future restrictions on voting rights would be analyzed rigorously. 
The next landmark case in voting and election-related 
jurisprudence was Anderson v. Celebrezze,247 which dealt primarily 
with the issue of ballot access.248  In Anderson, the petitioner was an 
independent presidential candidate who, because of an early filing 
requirement for independent candidates in the Ohio Revised Code, was 
precluded from appearing on the Ohio ballot.249  The Court framed the 
issue as whether the early filing requirement placed an 
“unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of 
Anderson’s supporters.”250  Although the deadline directly impacted 
only the independent candidate himself, the Court asserted that “the 
rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to 
neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some 
theoretical, correlative effect on voters.”251  The Court stated that 
“[a]lthough these rights of voters are fundamental, not all restrictions 
imposed by the States on candidates’ eligibility for the ballot impose 
constitutionally-suspect burdens on voters’ rights to associate or to 
choose among candidates.”252  It supported this assertion by reasoning 
that a certain amount of election regulation is required by the 
government in order to assist the democratic process.253  The Court 
reasoned that the issue should be examined in light of its impact on 
voters because the restrictions reduce the choices available to them.254  
Discussing these implication, the Court added in a footnote that it 
based its conclusions “directly on the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments” and did not “engage in a separate Equal Protection 
Clause analysis.”255 
Reasoning that challenges to state election laws cannot be 
resolved with a “litmus paper test,” the Court set forth a new balancing 
 
246 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189. 
247 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 782-83. 
250 Id. at 782. 
251 Id. at 786 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)). 
252 Id. at 788. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 786. 
255 Id. at 786 n.7. 
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test to analyze “challenges to specific provisions of a [s]tate’s election 
laws”:256 
Instead, a Court must resolve such a challenge by an 
analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary 
litigation. It must first consider the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the 
plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It must then identify and 
evaluate the precise interests put forward by the [s]tate 
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In 
passing judgment, the Court must not only determine 
the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it 
must also consider the extent to which those interests 
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights. Only 
after weighing all these factors is the reviewing Court 
in a position to decide whether the challenged provision 
is unconstitutional.257 
Applying this balancing test, the Court held that the burdens 
placed on the Ohio voters’ freedom of choice and freedom of 
association outweighed the state’s minimal interests.258  Anderson thus 
initiated the Court’s shift from a heightened to a more flexible standard 
of scrutiny in election-related cases.259  Even though the facts of 
Anderson dealt with the issue of a political candidate’s ballot access,260 
the open-ended language of its new balancing test allowed for varying 






256 Id. at 789 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).  The Court stated that 
such challenges cannot be resolved by a test “that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.”  
Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 806.  
259 Brilleaux, supra note 170, at 1032. 
260 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782-83. 
261 Brilleaux, supra note 170, at 1032. 
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IV. CONFLICTING PRECEDENT 
A. The Blanket Primary: California Democratic Party 
v. Jones 
In California Democratic Party v. Jones,262 the Supreme Court 
invalidated a blanket primary system adopted by a referendum of 
California voters in 1996.  California’s blanket primary system listed 
every candidate regardless of party affiliation on each ballot.263  A 
voter could choose freely among the candidates for each office 
regardless of a candidate’s or a voter’s party.264  The highest vote-
winner of each party received that party’s nomination for the general 
election.265  The Court began with a discussion of the importance of 
political parties’ First Amendment right to exclude, holding that 
Proposition 198 contravenes this right because it “forces political 
parties to associate with—to have their nominees, and hence their 
positions, determined by—those who, at best, have refused to affiliate 
with the party, and at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival.”266  
In so reasoning, the Court referred to the fact that in some primary 
races, votes totaled more than twice the number of registered party 
members.267  The Court concluded that the effect of these non-party 
votes would ultimately change the message and direction of the party 
and was thus severe.268  Because the Court “c[ould] think of no heavier 
burden on a political party’s associational freedom,” it required that 
the blanket primary survive strict scrutiny.269  Proposition 198 failed 
strict scrutiny because none of the seven articulated objectives of the 
law advanced were sufficiently compelling.270  Even having found no 
compelling state interest, the Court considered whether the blanket 
primary laws were narrowly tailored to the state interest and concluded 
that they were not.271  The Court suggested that a nonpartisan primary 
would serve the state’s interest without imposing severe burdens on 
 




266 Id. at 574, 577. 
267 Id. at 578. 
268 Id. at 579. 
269 Id. at 582. 
270 Id. at 582-85. 
271 Id. 
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political parties’ freedom of association right.272  The Court also noted, 
however, that associational rights of political parties should be 
construed neither, as absolute, nor as comprehensive, as rights enjoyed 
by wholly private associations.273 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented from the 
Court’s decision.274  In his dissent, Justice Stevens implied that 
political parties’ status as either private or public was determined 
according to the functions they were performing.275  Thus, 
[w]hen a political party defines the organization and 
composition of its governing units, when it decides 
what candidates to endorse, and when it decides 
whether and how to communicate those endorsements 
to the public, it is engaged in the kind of private 
expressive associational activity that the First 
Amendment protects.276 
Justice Stevens distinguished those activities from involvement 
in primary elections that were “quintessential forms of state action” 
because they were elections to public office paid for and administered 
by the states.277  Drawing on the White Primary cases, Justice Stevens 
considered California’s primary, funded as it is by public money and 
conducted by state officials, the “quintessential [form] of state action” 
and “an election, unlike a convention or a caucus, . . . a public 
affair.”278  According to Justice Stevens, party associational rights thus 
take on a completely different character in this context, as opposed to 
a case, such as Eu, where the law implicated political parties’ “internal 
processes” and the parties’ core First Amendment right to expression 
was at stake.279  Moreover, the motivation behind the law—to 
encourage electoral participation—distinguished this case from 
Tashjian, where the law sought to restrict participation.280  “When a 
State acts not to limit democratic participation but to expand the ability 
of individuals to participate in the democratic process,” Justice Stevens 
 
272 Id. at 585-86. 
273 Id. at 593 (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 360 (1997)). 
274 Id. at 590 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
275 See id. at 591-96 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
276 Id. at 592 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
277 Id. at 594 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
278 Id. at 594-95 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
279 Id. at 593 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
280 Id. at 601 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
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argued, “it is acting not as a foe of the First Amendment but as a friend 
and ally.”281  “Although it may have limited the power of party activists 
to control primary outcomes, the blanket primary expanded expression 
by allowing all voters the opportunity to pledge their support to the 
candidate of their choice.”282  “That same pro-participation 
justification underlies virtually every state’s decision to intrude on 
party autonomy by mandating the primary as the form of nomination 
method or allowing some nonmembers to choose the ballot of the party 
of their choice on election day.”283  Justice Stevens therefore warned, 
“[t]he Court’s reliance on a political party’s ‘right not to associate’ as 
a basis for limiting a State’s power to conduct primary elections will 
inevitably require it either to draw unprincipled distinctions among 
various primary configurations or to alter voting practices throughout 
the Nation in fundamental ways.”284 
B. The Closed Primary: Nader v. Schaffer 
In Nader v. Schaffer,285 the Supreme Court summarily affirmed 
a lower court ruling rejecting voters’ claims that closed primaries 
violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  In its analysis, 
the district court, which was later affirmed without opinion by the 
Supreme Court, began by emphasizing that being unable to vote in a 
primary election “does not prevent [plaintiffs] from working in support 
of or contributing money to their favorite candidates within these 
Parties or candidates in other major or minor parties.”286  The district 
court further indicated that even if plaintiffs could not vote in a party 
primary, there remains enough competition between candidates that 
“no one party’s primary election is completely determinative of the 
outcome.”287  The district court in Nader went on to address the equal 
protection issues raised by the plaintiffs.288  The plaintiffs claimed that 
a closed primary election “deprives them of equal protection of the 
laws by denying them the right to participate in elections in which they 
 
281 Id. at 595-96 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
282 VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE: CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIMENT WITH THE BLANKET 
PRIMARY 314 (Bruce E. Cain & Elisabeth R. Gerber eds., 2002). 
283 Id. 
284 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 597 (2000). 
285 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976), aff’d without opinion, 429 U.S. 989 (1976). 
286 Id. at 842.  
287 Id. at 843.  
288 Id. at 843-49. 
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are ‘interested’ and by which they are ‘affected,’ to the same extent as 
those persons who may vote, solely because plaintiffs do not enroll in 
political parties.”289  In support of their arguments, the plaintiffs cited 
to a line of Supreme Court cases that held, “in an election of general 
interest, restrictions on the franchise other than residence, age, and 
citizenship must promote a compelling state interest in order to survive 
constitutional attack.”290  The district court distinguished the plaintiffs’ 
cases, arguing that primary elections are not elections of general 
interest; rather, they are elections of particular interest to party 
members because they are concerned with “nominating the candidate 
who presents the best chance of winning the general election while 
remaining most faithful to party policies and philosophies.”291  In 
response to claims of compelled association, the court found that the 
burden placed on voters was minimal.292  Rather than apply strict 
scrutiny, the Nader court determined that primary election systems 
need only pass the court’s less rigorous test, because the burden placed 
on the plaintiffs’ associational and voting rights was minimal.293  The 
district court concluded that the closed primary was reasonably related 
to the legitimate goal of protecting the associational rights of party 
members. 
Ten years later the Supreme Court was presented with a 
challenge to the very same closed primary statute in Tashjian v. 
Republican Party of Connecticut.294  In Tashjian, the Court held that 
Connecticut’s establishment of a primary closed to nonparty voters, 
given the party’s desire to have a primary open to independents, 
violated the party’s First Amendment associational rights and was thus 
unconstitutional.295  The Court, however, expressly cautioned that its 
holding was limited to the particular set of circumstances before it.296  
The Court thus “had no occasion to address either the State’s interests 
 
289 Id. at 848. 
290 Id.; see, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 295 (1975); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 
399 U.S. 204, 207-13 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (per 
curiam); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1969). 
291 Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 848. 
292 Id. at 843-44. 
293 Id. at 849. 
294 479 U.S. 208 (1968). 
295 Id. at 214. 
296 Id. at 224 n.13 (“Our holding today does not establish that state regulation of primary 
voting qualifications may never withstand challenge by a political party or its membership.”). 
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in an open or blanket primary or the burdens imposed on a political 
party by such a primary system.”297 
C. The Semi-Closed Primary: Clingman v. Beaver 
In Clingman v. Beaver,298 the Supreme Court held that, 
although under Tashjian parties have a right to invite independents to 
vote in their primaries, parties do not have a right to invite members of 
other parties if the state chooses to run a semi-closed primary.299  
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas held that any burden the semi-
closed primary law might impose on the associational rights of voters 
was “minor and justified by legitimate state interests.”300  Justice 
Thomas distinguished Tashjian solely on the ground that the 
Connecticut law required a voter to register with a party to vote in that 
party’s primary, whereas the Oklahoma law only required that the 
same voter deregister from another party and declare himself an 
independent.301  The Oklahoma statute imposed a less severe burden 
on voters because it did not require them to affiliate publicly with a 
party in order to vote in that party’s primary; instead, the statute 
required voters only to disaffiliate from any other party and declare 
themselves independents.302  Further, any burden that the statute’s 
party registration requirement imposed on voters was not by itself a 
severe burden because electoral regulations often require voters to take 
some affirmative action.303  Justice Thomas concluded that these 
“minor barriers” to association imposed by the statute did not warrant 
the strict scrutiny review applied in Tashjian.304  Rather, Justice 
Thomas found that the statute withstood ordinary scrutiny because the 
semi-closed primary law advanced “a number of regulatory interests” 
including “‘preserv[ing] [political] parties as viable and identifiable 
interest groups,’ enhanc[ing] parties’ electioneering and party-building 
efforts, and guard[ing] against party raiding and ‘sore loser’ 
 
297 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (E.D. Cal. 1997). 
298 544 U.S. 581 (2005). 
299 Id. at 593-94.  
300 Id. at 587. 
301 Id. at 591-92. 
302 Id. 
303 “Election laws invariably ‘affec[t]—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to 
vote and his right to associate with others for political ends.’” Id. at 593 (citation omitted). 
304 Id. 
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candidacies by spurned primary contenders.”305  Justice Thomas 
declined to consider the cumulative effect of the semi-closed primary 
law and other Oklahoma election laws on plaintiffs’ associational 
rights because plaintiffs had raised that issue for the first time before 
the Court.306 
Justice Stevens dissented,307 declaring that the semi-closed 
primary law imposed a heavy burden on the Libertarian Party’s 
associational rights308 and that “in the ordinary case the State simply 
has no interest in classifying voters by their political party and in 
limiting the elections in which voters may participate as a result of that 
classification.”309  He found that Oklahoma’s asserted interests were 
“either entirely speculative or simply protectionist measures that 
benefit the parties in power.”310  He also stated that the Court’s “undue 
deference to the interest in preserving the two-party system” had 
harmed “all participants in the political market,” including small 
political parties, independent candidates, and voters.311 
V. THE MODERN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. Primary Elections 
As of the 2016 election cycle, nine states have closed primaries, 
where participation in a party’s primary election is limited to voters 
who have registered as members of that party a specified period of time 
prior to the primary election.312  Fifteen states have open primaries, in 
which a registered voter, regardless of party affiliation, can vote freely 
in any party’s primary.313  Twenty-two states have a hybrid system, 
 
305 Id. at 594 (citations omitted). 
306 Id. at 597-98. 
307 Justice Ginsburg joined the dissent in full; Justice Souter joined in part. 
308 Clingman, 544 U.S. at 611 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
309 Id. 
310 Id. at 619. 
311 Id. at 619-20.  Justice Souter declined to join this portion of Justice Steven’s opinion. 
312 State Primary Election Types, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types.aspx (last updated June 
26, 2018).  Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, 
Pennsylvania and Oregon have closed primaries.  Id. 
313 Id.  Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin have open 
primaries.  Id. 
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with some variation between open and closed primaries for handling 
unaffiliated voters and changing registration.314  Four states have 
nonpartisan or “top-two” primaries, in which all candidates are listed 
on the same ballot, with the two candidates receiving the most votes 
overall advancing to the general election.315  
B. The 2016 Election 
Gone are the old style backroom deals and party bosses.316  Yet, 
“[t]he increased power that voters now exert over presidential 
nominees has not, however, been allocated equally among all 
voters.”317  Recently, studies have demonstrated that as much as 78% 
of Americans have not been encouraged to participate in their state’s 
primary or caucus.318  Illustrative of this point is the 2016 presidential 
primary, wherein 14% of eligible voters—9% of the whole nation—
voted for either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton as the nominees, but 
half of the primary voters chose other candidates.319  Indeed, tens of 
millions of registered voters did not participate in the 2016 presidential 
election, and the share of who cited a “dislike of the candidates or 
campaign issues” as their main reason for not casting a ballot reached 
a new high.320  In other recent presidential elections, the share of 
registered voters who said they did not participate because they 
 
314 Id.  Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia and Wyoming have a hybrid system.  
Id. 
315 Id.  California, Louisiana, Nebraska (for nonpartisan legislative races only) and 
Washington have top-two primaries.  Id. 
316 Sean Wilentz & Julian E. Zelizer, A Rotten Way to Pick a President, WASH. POST (Feb. 
17, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/14/AR20080214 
01595.html. 
317 Underenfranchisement: Black Voters and the Presidential Nominating Process, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2318, 2318 (2004). 
318 CRAIGCONNECTS & BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHY IS IT SO HARD TO VOTE IN 
AMERICA? AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO FIX IT. (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/def 
ault/files/analysis/voting-in-america-infographic-FINAL.pdf. 
319 Alicia Parlapiano & Adam Pearce, Only 9% of America Chose Trump and Clinton as 
the Nominees, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/01/u 
s/elections/nine-percent-of-america-selected-trump-and-clinton.html?_r=0. 
320 Gustavo López & Antonio Flores, Dislike of Candidates or Campaign Issues Was Most 
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disliked the candidates or campaign issues was considerably lower.321  
Regardless of the purported benefits of closed partisan primary 
systems, a process that discourages millions of voters from 
participating is worthy of reconsideration.  Simply put, unaffiliated 
voters in the general election are denied a meaningful right to vote 
because their preferred candidate, or at least a larger, diverse pool of 
candidates, dissipates after primary elections.  
C. Changing Demographics 
As discussed above the profile of the United States has 
changed, and unaffiliated voters are now a plurality of the electorate.  
D. Low Voter Turnout 
Low voter turnout is another sad hallmark of the existing 
electoral regime in the United States.  For decades, participation in 
presidential elections has ranged from about 50 to 60% of eligible 
voters,322 and in midterm elections has averaged between 25 and 
45%.323  Voter turnout in state and local elections324 is generally much 
worse,325 and sometimes in the single digits.326  Beyond statistics, low 
voter turnout also has the effect of skewing politics and policymaking 
towards the preference of groups most likely to turn out: whites, older 
Americans, the affluent, and those with more education by significant-
to-wide margins.327  As a result, those who have historically faced, and 
continue to face, active suppression of their right to vote are 
substantially underrepresented in the electoral process and in policy 
 
321 Id. 
322 Voter Turnout: National Turnout Rate, 1787-2016, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, 
http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/voter-turnout-data (last visited Mar. 17, 
2019).  
323 Voter Turnout, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/voter_turnout#voter_turnout_101 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
324 Kriston Capps, In the U.S., Almost No One Votes in Local Elections, CITYLAB (Nov. 1, 
2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/11/in-the-us-almost-no-one-votes-in-local-electi 
ons/505766/.  
325 Mike Maciag, Voter Turnout Plummeting in Local Elections, GOVERNING (Oct. 2014), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-voter-turnout-municipal-elections.html.  
326 Neal Caren, Big City, Big Turnout? Electoral Participation in American Cities, 29 J. 
URBAN AFF. 31 (2007). 
327 Sean McElwee, Why Voting Matters: Large Disparities in Turnout Benefit the Donor 
Class, DEMOS (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.demos.org/publication/why-voting-matters-large-
disparities-turnout-benefit-donor-class.  
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making.328  We need an election system that engages and encourages 
more people of color, low-income people, young people, and LGBT 
individuals to participate in the political process, in order to ensure 
greater balance in electoral and policy outcomes, so that our 
democracy is more just. 
E. Harvard Business Report 
A report of the Harvard Business School brings a new 
analytical lens to understand the performance of our political system: 
the lens of industry competition, used for decades to understand 
competition and performance in other industries.329  This industry 
competition lens sheds new light on the failure of politics in America, 
which has become a major business in its own right.  It demonstrates 
that political problems are not due to a single cause, but instead the 
result of the nature of the political competition that the actors (i.e., the 
political parties) have created.  The report challenges the conventional 
wisdom about why gridlock is the norm (the political system is not 
broken; it is doing what it is designed to do) and questions the wisdom 
of allowing private organizations—the political parties—to control the 
rules of the game.  Most significantly, the report also puts forth a 
strategy for reinvigorating our democracy by addressing the root 
causes of the political dysfunction and prescribes a number of 
structural remedies, beginning with moving to nonpartisan open 
primaries. 
VI. ANALYSIS: PARTY RIGHTS, VOTING RIGHTS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
In their defense of closed primaries and their efforts to shut 
down the various forms of open primaries, the parties, major and 
minor, have relied on the assertion that they are private associations 
free to define the parameters of association with them.330  This position 
 
328 Sean McElwee et al., How Oregon Increased Voter Turnout More Than Any Other State, 
NATION (July 27, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-oregon-increased-voter-
turnout-more-than-any-other-state/.  
329 KATHERINE M. GEHL & MICHAEL E. PORTER, WHY COMPETITION IN THE POLITICS 
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carried the day in Jones where Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
cited Hurley v. Irish–American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston,331 a case in which the Court held that the South Boston Allied 
War Veterans Council had the right to exclude openly gay and lesbian 
organizations from participating in its annual St. Patrick’s Day parade 
under their own banner.332  The Court held that a private association 
had the right to control the message articulated in its parade. 
The parties followed up on their success in Jones by 
challenging primary systems in Washington, Idaho, South Carolina, 
Hawaii and Montana. 
A. Washington 
The Jones decision forced the State of Washington to discard 
its identical partisan blanket primary that had been in place since 
1935.333  After the Ninth Circuit invalidated Washington’s primary as 
“materially indistinguishable from the California scheme,”334 I-872 
was introduced specifically to fit within the legal confines articulated 
in Jones.335  This initiative implemented a top-two primary in 
Washington, which provides that all candidates for a “partisan office” 
appear together on the primary ballot which is voted on by all voters, 
with the two candidates receiving the most votes overall advancing to 
the general election.336  The initiative passed in 2004 with over 60% of 
the vote.337 
The Washington State Republican Party, joined by the 
Washington State Democratic Central Committee and Libertarian 
Party of Washington, filed a facial challenge against I-872,338 claiming 
that the new system violated its associational rights by depriving the 
organization of its ability to nominate its own candidates and by 
forcing it to associate with candidates it did not endorse.339  The district 
court granted the parties’ motion for summary judgment and enjoined 
 
331 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
332 Id. at 578. 
333 Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 445 (2008). 
334 Id. at 446. 
335 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 598 n.8 (2000). 
336 Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 447-48. 
337 Id. at 447. 
338 Id. at 448. 
339 Id. 
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implementation of I-872.340  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that I-
872 was facially invalid because the party-preference designation 
created the risk that the primary winners would be perceived as the 
parties’ nominees—therefore creating an “impression of associational 
ties”—even if the party did not want to be associated with the 
candidate.341 
In a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that I-872 
was similar to California’s blanket primary because the ballot initiative 
did not choose parties’ nominees; rather, the primary was a process of 
cutting down the list of candidates for the general election.342  The 
Court also rejected arguments regarding voter confusion because they 
did not depend on facial requirements, but on possible factual 
scenarios inappropriate for a facial challenge.343  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Thomas emphasized the right of the State and its 
voters to determine what electoral system they wanted to implement.  
Chief Justice Roberts concurred on the ground that there was no right 
to stop an individual from associating with a party, even if a party does 
not want that association.344  However, he agreed with the possibility 
of this case being litigated again if evidence of voter confusion 
surfaced as a result of ballot design.345 
B. Idaho 
In Idaho Republican Party v. Ysursa,346 the Idaho Republican 
Party brought suit against the Idaho Secretary of State alleging that 
Idaho’s use of an open primary system to determine nominees for the 
general election violated the Idaho Republican Party’s First 
Amendment rights.347  Under Idaho law, political party candidates for 
the general election were required to be chosen by the Idaho open 
primary election.348  Idaho’s open primary required voters to choose 
 
340 Wash. State Republican Party v. Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907, 932 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
341 Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash., 460 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2006). 
342 Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 455. 
343 Id. at 453. 
344 Id. at 461 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
345 Id. at 460-61 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
346 765 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Idaho 2011). 
347 Id. at 1268-69. 
348 Id. 
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one party’s ballot.349  Idaho voters did not register a party affiliation.350  
After a bench trial in which the court received substantial evidence 
related to actual voter conduct and expert testimony concerning cross-
over voting, the court concluded that the Idaho open primary statute 
“is unconstitutional as applied to the Idaho Republican Party.”351  The 
court relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Jones.352  The court 
determined that no “meaningful distinction” existed between the open 
primary in Idaho and the blanket primary in Jones.353  On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment with instructions to 
dismiss the case as moot, after Idaho’s legislature changed its primary 
system.354 
C. South Carolina 
In Greenville County Republican Party Executive Committee 
v. South Carolina,355 a local Republican Party asserted a facial 
challenge to South Carolina’s open primary system.  The court 
recognized that any election law will “impose some burden upon 
individual voters [and political organizations].”356  The mere fact that 
a state’s system “creates barriers . . . does not of itself compel close 
scrutiny.”357  The court acknowledged that under South Carolina’s 
open primary system, non-partisan registration system, a registered 
voter may request, on election day, the ballot for any party’s primary 
in which the voter intends to vote, regardless of whether the voter 
previously had registered as a member of the party.358  The court noted, 
however, that “the voter may only vote in one party’s primary 
election.”359  The court declined to uphold a facial challenge to the 
South Carolina law that would contradict precedent that generally 




351 Id. at 1277. 
352 Id. at 1269-75. 
353 Id. at 1275. 
354 See Idaho Republican Party v. Ysursa, No. 11-35251 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2011) (Order 
granting Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal). 
355 824 F. Supp. 2d 655 (D.S.C. 2011). 
356 Id. at 662 (alteration in original) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992)). 
357 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433). 
358 Id. at 663. 
359 Id. 
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political party’s associational rights.360  The court also stressed the 
public nature of participation in the process of nominating candidates 
for public office, in a manner that echoes Justice Stevens’ dissent in 
Jones.  Nonetheless, the district court allowed the case to proceed to 
trial.  Prior to trial, however, the State Republican Party withdrew as a 
party, and the court granted the State’s motion to dismiss on the ground 
that the Greenville County Republican Organization lacked standing.  
The Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal on appeal.361 
D. Hawaii 
In Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago,362 the district court 
addressed a facial challenge to Hawaii’s open primary election non-
partisan registration system brought by the Democratic Party of 
Hawaii (“DPH”).363  Hawaii law required candidates to be nominated 
by primary election.364  Voters could cast votes in a primary election 
without declaring a party preference.365  The court denied the facial 
challenge for two reasons: (1) the DPH failed to show that the open 
primary should be considered “unconstitutional in all of its 
applications”; and (2) the DPH “failed to prove a severe burden.”366  
“Proving a severe burden must be done ‘as-applied,’ with an 
evidentiary record.”367  The evidence in Jones indicated that “the 
impact of voting by non-party members is much greater upon minor 
parties.”368  The court declined to import the California evidence in 
Jones due to questions about its applicability to a major party in 
Hawaii.369  The court could not determine that the DPH had been 
“severely” burdened based on the mere assertion that “it will be, or can 
be, forced to ‘associate’ with voters who are ‘adherents of opposing 
parties.’”370  The court recognized the possibility that crossover voting 
 
360 Id. at 664. 
361 Greenville Cty. Republican Party Exec. Comm. v. Greenville Cty. Election Comm’n, 
604 F. App’x 244 (4th Cir. 2015). 
362 982 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1170 (D. Haw. 2013), aff’d, 833 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2016), cert 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2114 (2017). 
363 Id. at 1168. 
364 Id. at 1169. 
365 Id. 
366 Id. at 1177. 
367 Id. 
368 Id. at 1176 (quoting Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 578 (2000)). 
369 Id. at 1182-83. 
370 Id. at 1182. 
43
Gruber et al.: Voting Rights Act
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019
692 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
exists in Hawaii, but also recognized the possibility that “a large 
percentage of primary voters who were not formally registered with 
the DPH” but who affiliated with the DPH by voting in the Democratic 
primary “fully considered themselves to be Democrats.”371  The court 
pointed out that the DPH lacked “empirical evidence” that had been 
present in Jones.372  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding “[t]he 
[s]everity of the [b]urden [t]hat a [p]rimary [s]ystem [i]mposes on 
[a]ssociational [r]ights [i]s a [f]actual [i]ssue on [w]hich the [p]laintiff 
[b]ears the [b]urden of [p]roof” and “[t]he Democratic Party [h]as 
failed to [a]dduce [e]vidence [s]howing the [e]xtent of the [b]urden on 
[i]ts [a]ssociational [r]ights.”373  The court further found that the 
choosing of a Democratic Party ballot by a primary voter constituted a 
sufficient act of affiliation with the party to blunt the DPH’s claim that 
its associational rights were violated.374  The Supreme Court denied the 
plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari.375 
E. Montana 
In Ravalli County Republican Central Committee v. 
McCulloch,376 the Republican Party and its county committees 
contested Montana’s open primary law on grounds similar to those 
presented by the Democratic Party in Nago.377  The Montana district 
court reached the same conclusion as the Hawaii district court in Nago, 
and indeed, cited Nago.378 
F. New Jersey 
In the litigation described above, the two major political parties 
squared off against the State, with voters sometimes participating as 




373 Democratic Party of Haw. v. Nago, 833 F.3d 1119, 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2114 (2017). 
374 Id. 
375 Democratic Party of Haw. v. Nago, 137 S. Ct. 2114 (2017). 
376 154 F. Supp. 3d 1063 (D. Mont. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Ravalli Cty. Republican v. 
McCulloch, No. 16-35375 (9th Cir. May 4, 2016), appeal dismissed, 655 F. App’x 592 (9th 
Cir. 2016). 
377 Id. at 1066. 
378 Id. at 1075-80. 
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New Jersey,379 the Third Circuit considered a challenge brought by 
unaffiliated voters to New Jersey’s closed primary system, which like 
that at issue in Nader, required party registration as a pre-requisite to 
voting in a primary election.  Rejecting the voters’ argument that the 
closed primary system violated their rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, the court determined that the “reasoning of 
Nader is directly applicable here” because “Nader [considered] the 
countervailing rights of individuals who were not members of a 
political party, and it found that the associational rights of party 
members and the regulatory interests of the state outweighed those 
rights.”380  The court thus applied a rational basis test and upheld the 
constitutionality of New Jersey’s closed primary system.381  The Third 
Circuit ignored the significant growth in the number of unaffiliated 
voters since Nader was decided some 40 years earlier.  It also ignored 
that Nader was a district court decision affirmed without opinion by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  The voters’ application for certiorari to the 
Supreme Court was denied.382 
As things currently stand, until the Supreme Court decides to 
more fully address the constitutional status of open and closed 
primaries, a State has the right to force a party to accept an open one 
in which unaffiliated voters can participate, and voters do not have the 
right to overturn a closed one.  Significantly, however, the voice of the 
voters, in particular unaffiliated voters, is beginning to be heard. 
In New Mexico litigation was commenced by writ of 
mandamus raising the issue of whether it is constitutional for a state to 
tax unaffiliated voters to pay for closed primaries in which they are not 
allowed to participate.383  Most states have “anti-donation clauses” in 
their constitutions, such as that in New Mexico which states in Article 
IX, Section 14 of the state’s constitution: 
Neither the state nor any county, school district or 
municipality, except as otherwise provided in this 
constitution, shall directly or indirectly lend or pledge 
its credit or make any donation to or in aid of any 
person, association or public or private corporation or 
in aid of any private enterprise for the construction of 
 
379 607 F. App’x 177 (3d Cir. 2015). 
380 Id. at 183. 
381 Id. 
382 Balsam v. Guadagno, 136 S. Ct. 189 (2015). 
383 See Chavez v. Oliver, No. S-1-SC-37371 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 2018). 
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any railroad except as provided in Subsections A 
through G of this section.384 
This challenge sought to resolve the tension between party rights and 
voters’ rights in favor of the voters.  If a party sought to have the 
government fund the process by which it nominates its candidates, it 
must allow all voters, regardless of party affiliation or non-affiliation 
to participate.  The New Mexico Supreme Court dismissed the writ 
without reaching the merits.385 
Questions of remedies remain open as well.  For example, can 
a state satisfy both the unaffiliated voters’ claims to equal protection 
and full participation, and the rights of the parties by funding and 
administering a primary election open to unaffiliated voters to select a 
candidate who will appear on the general election ballot as an 
“independent.”  This would leave the parties free to nominate by 
members only, and give independents a way to participate in the 
primary round as well. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The developments outlined above can be understood as the 
dialectic between eliminating barriers to participation by particular 
groupings and the commitment to full and equal voting rights for all.  
After the Nineteenth Amendment granted women the right to vote in 
1920 and Native Americans were granted that right by statute in 1924, 
the franchise included every citizen, at least legally.  The focus shifted 
to overcoming efforts to limit or take away what the Constitution 
granted. 
In the “white primary cases” the Supreme Court struck down 
manipulation of the primary system in southern states to disenfranchise 
African Americans.  Literacy tests, poll taxes and voter identification 
laws have been the subject of litigation and legislation such as the 1965 
Voting Rights Act.  There have, of course, been setbacks, most 
notably, the invalidation of the “pre-clearance” provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder.386  The two major 
parties have tended to approach these issues from the vantage point of 
what best contributes to outcomes they favor.  Thus, Republicans have 
 
384 N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14. 
385 Chavez, No. S-1-SC-37371 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2019). 
386 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
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used voter identification laws to suppress the vote in poor communities 
of color.  Restoring voting rights to person convicted of felonies, 
including those still incarcerated, has been a cause for some 
Democratic politicians. 
The malapportionment cases have a particular legal 
significance.  There, those seeking legal protection were not members 
of a disfavored class of citizens with a status dependent on 
circumstances over which they had no control such as race and gender.  
In the gay rights movement, the achievement of legal equality was 
coupled with the position that sexual preference was not a matter of 
choice, but the result of an innate personal characteristic. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that a principal argument in 
support of closed primaries has been that if you want to vote in a 
party’s primary election, then join the party.  In Democratic Party of 
Hawaii v. Nago, the Court of Appeals upheld the open primary in part 
on the rationale that a voter’s choosing of the Democratic Party ballot 
on primary election day was a sufficient measure of affiliation to 
satisfy the Party’s freedom of association rights. 
What is significant about the reapportionment cases is that they 
rested on the proposition that each and every voter was entitled to equal 
treatment.  A voter’s status was independent of race, gender or sexual 
preference.  The Court did not say if you want your vote to count more, 
then move to farm country.  Voter equality was recognized as an 
undeniable right of citizenship.  If that is the case, then the choice to 
remain free of party affiliation cannot deprive a voter of full 
participation in every phase of the electoral process.  The state can no 
more condition a voter’s right to vote in the primary phase of the 
electoral process on party affiliation than it could condition it on race, 
gender or sexual preference.  The only status that matters is citizenship.  
And all citizens must be treated equally and as fully enfranchised.  
We believe it is incumbent on the courts to address the issues 
discussed in this article with a view to continuing the more than two 
centuries effort to achieve full voting rights for all American citizens.  
They will not be resolved until the U.S. Supreme Court takes them up.  
The Court’s duty is to apply long standing principles in a manner that 
allows justice to prevail in circumstances that have recently been 
placed on the judicial and historical agenda by the rise of the 
unaffiliated voter and the assertion of her rights as such.  Thus, in 
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Obergefell v. Hodges,387 the Supreme Court, in ruling that same sex 
marriages are constitutionally protected, looked at the historical 
expanse of the history of marriage in this nation and the world and 
stated: 
The identification and protection of 
fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial 
duty to interpret the Constitution. That responsibility, 
however, has not been reduced to any formula. Rather, 
it requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in 
identifying interests of the person so fundamental that 
the State must accord them its respect. That process is 
guided by many of the same considerations relevant to 
analysis of other constitutional provisions that set forth 
broad principles rather than specific requirements. 
History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry 
but do not set its outer boundaries. That method 
respects our history and learns from it without allowing 
the past alone to rule the present. 
The nature of injustice is that we may not 
always see it in our own times. The generations that 
wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not presume to know the extent of 
freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted 
to future generations a charter protecting the right of all 
persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When 
new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s 
central protections and a received legal stricture, a 
claim to liberty must be addressed.388 
In addressing the fundamental rights of unaffiliated voters, we 
urge and challenge our courts to consider their plight as the next step 
on the long road towards achieving the fair and equal right to vote that 
forms the core of our constitutional and democratic process.  As a 
nation, we cannot afford to ignore the assault on this process 
undertaken by the two major political parties in recent decades.  
As the nation continues to undergo the demographic and 
political changes referenced earlier, new demands are placed on our 
 
387 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
388 Id. at 2598. 
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electoral process.  Our history as a nation has evolved into a “two-
party” system (Democrats and Republicans) whose primaries are the 
first step for the election of those who govern us.  We cannot allow the 
parties’ claim that they are private associations to insulate them from 
the interests of unaffiliated voters and state government in the electoral 
process they fund and administer.  There can be no meaningful 
participation in American democracy unless you are entitled to vote in 
the major party primaries.   
The authors submit that the legal status of unaffiliated voters 
must be engaged by our courts if we are to be true to the best traditions 
of American justice.  Unaffiliated voters are treated as second class 
citizens.  This Article has, we hope, demonstrated that the right of 
unaffiliated voters to vote, and to vote in what are now closed 
primaries, is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person 
and her rights to freedom of speech and association under the First 
Amendment, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.389  This Article has, we hope, 
demonstrated that in the field of voting the doctrine of “separate but 
equal” has no place.  Segregating unaffiliated voters, preventing them 
from meaningful participation in the primaries, is inherently unequal 
and deprives them of what is due them under the Constitution.   
It is our hope that courts will use this Article to enhance their 
understanding of the issues that will come before them regarding free 
and fair elections.  It is also our hope that litigants will use this Article 
to continue to push the courts of this nation to live up to their duty as 
the guarantor of our constitutional liberties. 
 
389 See id. at 2604. 
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